By Bilal Al-Talidi, Moroccan writer and researcher
For the second time, and unusually, tension between Algeria and Moscow has openly erupted within the United Nations. After the Russian representative to the Security Council accused Algerian boxer Imane Khelif of being a man allowed to fight women by Western groups supporting the “LGBTQ community” during a Security Council briefing session on “Maintaining Commitments for Women and Security in the Context of Rapid Withdrawal of Peace Missions,” Ammar Bendjamaa, Algeria’s representative, called for international accountability for parties that carried out an attack in a northern Mali village near the Algerian border during a Security Council session on August 27.
The first indicator seems less severe as it relates to value issues played out in the sports field. Russia was looking for grounds to attack the Paris Olympics and used the case of athlete Imane Khelif, whom the International Boxing Association had previously reported as failing a gender test. Algeria wasn’t actually the target but got caught in the crossfire.
The second indicator, however, seems to reflect a genuine tension, showing a difference in strategic approaches to dealing with Mali, or more precisely, a contradiction between Russian and Algerian interests in the Sahel region south of the Sahara, especially regarding support for the Malian government and bridging Russia’s extension to Mali.
There are multiple indicators that the Algerian-Russian relationship has entered a state of tension. With the start of the election campaign in Algeria, retired General Khalifa Haftar, supported by Russia and the UAE, moved on the border east of Algeria, a step the Algerian Foreign Ministry considered “a threat to its national security.”
Although its Foreign Ministry statement tried to link the military mobilization near its borders to threats to consensus and reconciliation among Libyans, stating that it could undermine the path of Libyan national unity, it actually covered up the deep strategic disagreement between Algeria and Russia at a time when Azawad tribes inflicted significant losses on the Malian army and Wagner militias, which annoyed Moscow regarding Algeria’s role in supporting these tribes.
The details of the Russian-Algerian strategic disagreement go back to the Malian government’s decision to end the reconciliation sponsored by Algeria in 2015 between Mali and the Azawad tribes, and the entry of Malian-Algerian relations into a state of tension whose indicators are still evident today. Algeria supports the Azawad tribes and bases its strategic vision on these tribes being an extension of Algeria in Mali, while Mali sees Algeria’s policy as supporting separatism to strengthen its influence outside its territory.
Signs of the Russian-Algerian disagreement actually started early, specifically when Moscow felt betrayed by Algeria regarding its interests in the region. After Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov had hoped for Algeria’s ability to resist American pressures and not comply with its will to join American sanctions, saying that America had attacked the wrong country (meaning Algeria) following a letter sent by 27 US Senators to Secretary of State Antony Blinken proposing punishing Algeria according to the CAATSA law, Moscow was surprised by changes in the Algerian position that fell within the context of adapting to Western pressures, starting with maneuvering, passing through bowing to the storm, and ending with the option of offering concessions to Western countries to gain their support to alleviate American and European pressures.
On November 29, 2022, Algeria announced the postponement of joint military exercises with Russia, and the Algerian Ministry of Defense, in response to what its Russian counterpart had previously published regarding the date of these exercises, stated that it represents the only source concerned with announcing the date of any joint military exercise with its partners.
A number of observers linked the Defense Ministry’s statement to pressures from the United States and European countries to prevent the conclusion of a $17 billion military deal with Russia.
Then other indicators emerged of Algeria’s compliance with Western pressures. In the context of its rivalry with Morocco, it made important concessions to secure Paris’s help in alleviating American and European pressure. Its energy policy towards Paris and Rome was interpreted as weakening the Russian strategy in its confrontation with Western countries. French President Emmanuel Macron stated directly in Algeria after the announcement of an “exceptional partnership” between the two countries that France would not suffer an energy problem in the winter and that Algerian energy sources would help increase Europe’s gas imports and reduce its dependence on Russian gas.
Russia was greatly disturbed when Algeria proceeded on January 22 of last year, on the sidelines of a visit by Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni, to establish a new pipeline to supply Italy with gas and transform Rome into a major gas supply base for Europe.
The Russian response was not delayed. After months of monitoring the Algerian position, the BRICS group rejected Algeria’s membership in the alliance. The Russian Foreign Minister’s explanation was clear: expanding the BRICS group is subject to criteria including the weight of the state, its prestige, and its positions in the international arena.
Previously, the Algerian-Russian disagreement focused on two points: Algeria’s ability to resist American pressures and not comply with its policy of weakening the Russian strategy in the region, and Algeria’s reluctance to provide logistical support for Moscow’s expansion in the Sahel region.
Moscow tested Algeria on the first point and found that it primarily serves its sovereign interests and does not consider the alliance with Russia as necessitating any change in its policy, even if this policy practically harms Russia’s strategy in the region. Therefore, the Russian answer came clearly through the rejection of Algeria’s membership in the BRICS group.
On the second point, Moscow became certain that Algeria would not risk helping Russia logistically by supporting its geostrategic expansion in the Sahel region, as this would directly put it under serious Western threat. Moreover, it became more certain that Algeria’s national security calculations in the Sahel region are contrary to Russia’s interests. Algeria supports the Azawad tribes and considers them an extension of itself in Mali, while Moscow considers these tribes a stumbling block preventing it from deepening its presence and influence in Mali. This explains the hit-and-run policy between Moscow and Algeria. After the Algerian-backed Azawad tribes inflicted significant losses on Wagner militias, it was the turn of these Russian-backed militias to carry out deadly attacks on these tribes’ positions near the Algerian border, which disturbed the Algerian authorities.
The problem is that the matter is no longer limited to the conflict in the south of the Algerian border. Algeria’s national security, due to tensions with Russia, has also become threatened from the east. Algeria interprets the military mobilizations of retired General Khalifa Haftar as a Russian will to extend into the Malian depth and use Algerian territory to deliver weapons to the Malian government, to strengthen Russian influence in the Sahel region, which poses a serious threat to Algeria’s national security.
Algeria’s traditional options are being tested. Algeria’s success in maintaining a policy of neutrality towards Western countries, not going along with Russian ambitions, and at the same time supporting the Azawad tribes to secure the Algerian extension in Mali, means more tension with Moscow. Reviewing this traditional policy means jeopardizing its sovereignty and national security. Thus, it is between two choices: dismantling its alliance with Russia or harming its sovereignty and national security.
